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On subjectivity
Some scholars argue that in order to 
interpret the Quran, one must avoid 
all subjectivity. I do not agree with this 
proposition since, to be human, is to 
live a life that is politically, economically, 
sexually, culturally, and historically situ-
ated and subjectivity is merely the effect 
of encountering and comprehending 
the world through this situatedness. It is, 
therefore, unavoidable. Hence, instead 
of pretending that we encounter texts 
from some pure or abstract location outside the confines of time and 
space, we need to be open, honest, and self-conscious about the material 
and ideological sites from which we read them. In fact, that is one of the 
pre-requisites for entering into the hermeneutic circle. 
My first thesis, then, is that no Quran interpreter can avoid subjec-
tivity because it is an inescapable human condition. At best, we can 
be more or less cognizant about how our subject positions shape our 
readings of a text.
On language and interpretation
Another common idea is that only those people who have mastered 
Quranic Arabic should be allowed to interpret the Quran. I also disagree 
with this idea since it suggests that there is only one type of scriptural 
interpretation and seems to confuse translation with interpretation.
In its most basic sense, interpretation is simply the act of giving mean-
ing to what we read, so one does not need to be a language expert or a 
philologist to read a text interpretively since one 
does that anyway merely by virtue of reading it. 
Moreover, mastering a language does not ensure 
that we will arrive at the best or only valid reading 
of a text. If it did, the Quran would not have distin-
guished between better and worse readings of it2; 
the Prophet’s companions would not have differed 
in their understanding of some ayat3; Muslims 
would have had a universally agreed upon inter-
pretation of the Quran; and scholars like al-Ghazali 
would not have held that each ayah has possibly 
60,000 meanings.
The point that I am making is that interpretive 
differences are not reducible to language alone 
but also have to do with an interpreter’s method-
ology, epistemology, theology, and sexual politics. 
I will give two examples from Quranic exegesis to 
support my claim.
The first applies to those cases where, no matter how well scholars 
know Arabic, they cannot agree on the meaning of a word. A good ex-
ample is idribuhunna in verse 4:34 that most scholars read as “to beat” 
thereby interpreting the verse as giving a husband the right to beat 
his wife. However, the root of this word, daraba, has several different 
meanings—including “to go away”—and the Quran itself uses this 
word in seventeen different senses. So, the fact most interpreters have 
chosen one meaning, and the worst, and that most Muslims refuse to 
accept alternative interpretations as legitimate has less to do with lan-
guage than with the sexual politics of patriarchies that want to main-
tain male power over women.
Second, we may agree that a word can 
be interpreted in different ways, but 
that still does not mean that we will 
even get to the heart of the Quran’s 
teachings. For instance, the Quran asks 
us to read it for its best meanings. We 
may be open to accepting alternative 
meanings of best—like finest or most 
excellent—but that does not necessar-
ily mean that we will be able to get to 
the moral, social, or historical content 
of the word. That is because what we 
understand by “best” or “finest” will depend on our morals, our theol-
ogy, the type of society in which we live, the time period in which we 
live, and so on. Thus, knowing Arabic cannot help us to categorically 
define the best meanings of the Quran.
The discipline of Quranic exegesis itself attests to the limitations of 
language in yielding a complete understanding of the Quran. Thus, 
from the earliest times, scholars have known that the Quran has at 
least two levels of meaning. Tafsir, as we know, focuses on the exterior 
or apparent meanings, while ta'wil concerns itself with their interior 
or esoteric meanings. Indeed, an entire tradition in Islam—the Sufi—is 
based on trying to recover the interior meanings of the Quran through 
an array of spiritual practices including gnosis. 
Hence, my second thesis is that while the Quran lends itself to lan-
guage analysis, interpreting it does not necessarily require a mastery of 
Arabic since interpretation is not an exercise in philology.
On translation
In light of this, I understand the insistence on mastering Arabic as 
an argument about the need to read the Quran only in Arabic; i.e., as 
an argument against translating it. I agree that translating the Quran 
requires one to have mastered Arabic and several scholars (all men 
until now) have given us translations that most Muslims accept as 
reliable. It thus seems reasonable to argue that if we can read the 
Quran in translation, we can also interpret it in translation. But, while 
Muslims may accept translations of the Quran, they discourage their 
use for interpreting it on the grounds that the translated Quran is not 
the real Quran.
Clearly, since the Quran was revealed in Arabic, a special symbolism 
attaches to being able to read it in Arabic. However, to claim that the 
Quran in translation is not real implies that its ontological status—its 
“reality,” so to speak—derives from its being in Arabic rather than from 
its being God’s speech. This is a theologically unsound notion since the 
Quran’s ontological status has to do with its relationship to God, not to 
human language. Thus, divine speech is real in all languages because 
its reality stems from its being God’s word, not from being in a given 
language.
If the Quran is a universal text, as Muslims believe, then its universal-
ity lies in its being equally real in all languages, and not just in one. In 
what way can the Quran be universal when non-Arabs, non-literates, 
non-males, are excluded from understanding or interpreting it in light 
of the faculties and grace given them by God?
My third thesis, then, is that the Quran is real in all languages and is 
as open to being interpreted or misinterpreted in these languages as 
it is in Arabic.
In this article, Barlas joins the debates on 
the right and authority of Muslim women to 
interpret the Quran.1 As a way to move the 
conversation beyond simply asserting or 
refuting the right of this or that person to 
read the Quran on this or that condition, she 
distinguishes between different types of 
interpretations and authority. Simultaneously, 
she attempts to come to grips with the tensions 
between an individual believer’s reading of the 
Quran and that of the community. 
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My fourth thesis then is that we should not privatize the Quran by mak-
ing a group or individual the sole arbiters of its meanings; indeed, it is 
the ummah’s obligation to ensure that all Muslims have free access to 
the Quran.
On (and in) practice
In principle, Quranic ideas of faith open up “an infinite space for the 
promotion of the individual beyond the constraints of fathers and 
brothers, clans and tribes, riches and tributes.”9 In practice, of course, 
Muslims have not actualized the promise of such views. Most women, 
in particular, have never had lives beyond the “constraints of fathers 
and brothers” for various reasons, including how Muslims have chosen 
to interpret the Quran.
While I do not blame the Quran for its anti-women readings—the 
burden lies squarely on its interpreters—I understand the bitterness of 
those who do. But, then, smearing Islam has become a vocation in the 
West these days, as has its opposite: recovering 
the “true” Islam in line with Anglo-European sen-
sibilities. As Disraeli once said of the East, Islam 
is now a career. Even so, I draw comfort from the 
fact that for most Muslims, the venture of Islam 
can never be a policy issue tied to the political 
ambitions and financial apron strings of a su-
perpower run amok who is chastising us for not 
being moderate enough.
I do not disregard the urgency of reform in Mus-
lim societies, but I believe that it can only come 
from those who consider Islam to be their moral 
compass in this world. Meanwhile, I suspect that 
Muslim interpretations of the Quran are likely to 
remain unworthy of it. But, we do not have to set-
tle for the worst, as we have done by embracing 
anti-women interpretations for so long. To strive 
for ever-better understandings of our scripture is 
a calling for all those who are moved by it. The 
test of a moral community and of moral individu-
ality both is how far we can fulfil that calling by 
relying on what God has chosen to give us. That is 
my fifth thesis and also my conclusion.
On authority
If I am right that the Quran is a universal text, that know-
ing Arabic cannot ensure interpretive unanimity or accuracy, 
that the only way to decipher it is not just through language 
analysis and that no reading of it can be objective, then it 
seems necessary to rethink our view of who has the right to 
interpret it. The Quran itself has made it obligatory for each 
one of us to use our own intellect and reasoning to interpret 
it; it does not say that only males, or Arabs, or scholars can, 
or should, interpret it. In other words, it does not tie inter-
pretive rights to race, sex, class, or even literacy. Literacy and 
scholarship have never been the hallmark of prophets or 
sages, or, for that matter, of most believers who have usually 
been unlettered. To assume that these people cannot under-
stand the Quran because they lack scholarly knowledge is to 
disregard aspects of the Quran’s religiosity and universality 
and to confuse knowledge of God’s words with their “inner 
meanings,”4 a distinction the Quran itself makes. Potentially, 
anyone can arrive at these inner meanings through reflec-
tion.
The Quran does, of course, ask us to learn from and teach 
one another and a certain pedagogical role is part of the 
moral praxis of both women and men whom the Quran urges to en-
join the just and forbid the wrong.5 This type of moral pedagogy does 
not, however, allow us to claim a monopoly on religious knowledge or 
inerrancy in our understanding of it and nor is it based in the sort of 
institutionalized authority that Muslim interpretive communities have 
come to claim over the centuries.
Most significantly for our purposes, the Quran does not bind us to 
the moral authority of earlier generations without thinking through 
things for ourselves. It censures those who insist on following “the ways 
of their fathers,” a phrase that we can read literally as referring to rule 
by the father/husband (patriarchy),6 or, more generally, to traditions 
passed down over time. The Quran also warns us that if our parents try 
to make us “join in worship [with God] things of which thou hast no knowl-
edge, then obey them not.”7 These verses appear in particular contexts of 
course, but their message is clearly universal: we can only grasp divine truth 
by and for ourselves without any compulsions or constraints. Is this not why 
the Quran forbids coercion in matters of faith and religion?
On individuals and the community
Naturally, when we read a scripture within a community, our under-
standing of it can never be wholly free of the community’s understand-
ing of it. Indeed, if there is a conflict between them, we are pressed to 
subordinate the personal to the communal in the name of tradition, 
or rather, the dominant view of tradition. How, then, can we take indi-
vidual responsibility for interpreting the Quran?
This is a complex issue because, for Muslims, community and faith, or 
“ummah and din are mutually defining and they give distinctive character-
istics to the Islamic view of communal existence.”8 But, if this means that we 
can only practice our din to its full potential within a moral community, it 
does not mean that a community is, by definition, moral. Nor does it mean 
that living in a community frees us from the necessity of making interpre-
tive choices for ourselves. After all, if communal readings of the Quran 
were inerrant and we could rely blindly on them, why would the Quran 
protect our individual right and freedom to read it in light of our own 
knowledge and reason? Is it not because no one is infallible and no one 
can decide for another how to approach God? Is it not because God 
wants to give each of us the opportunity to respond to God’s call as 
best we can? If so, is it not reckless disregard and self-defeating for us 
to refuse this charge?
Regrettably, Muslims have not thought about the implications of 
such questions for the relationship between individual and communal 
readings of the Quran. Instead, we expect individuals to subordinate 
their interpretation of it to that of the ummah’s because we confuse 
communal norms with Quranic norms. However, communal and Qu-
ranic norms are not always the same. For instance, the communal norm 
is to treat the Quran as the preserve of a small group of males, typically 
Arabs and often scholars. To me, however, this “norm” is a heresy mas-
querading as orthodoxy because it subordinates the Quran (the univer-
sal) to males, Arabs, and scholars (the particular). The Quran, however, 
belongs to all Muslims and it gives each one of us the right to struggle 
to arrive at an understanding of it as a test of our morality.
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